Travel Safety Advice

Child abductions – Separating facts from fiction

red24 — Wed, 8 Aug 2007 16:21:00 GMT

The abduction of children naturally generates a great deal of public concern. Crimes such as the alleged kidnapping of four-year-old Madeleine McCann in Portugal and the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2003 are among the most notorious and highly publicised stories in recent history, occupying a central place in the fears and anxieties of parents everywhere. The abduction of a child is a crime that devastates families and traumatises entire communities. However, wider fears are exacerbated by considerable uncertainty over how frequently such crimes occur, which children are most at risk, and who the perpetrators tend to be.

At the heart of the problem is confusion about the definition of kidnapping. While lengthy ransom abductions and the tragic recovery of bodies has shaped the public’s perception of the crime, in a strict sense kidnapping also involves both short-term and short-distance displacements, acts common to many sexual assaults and robberies. Kidnapping occurs whenever a person is taken or detained against his or her will, and includes hostage situations – whether or not the victim is moved. Moreover, kidnapping is not limited to the acts of strangers but can be committed by friends, by romantic partners, and, as has been increasingly the case in recent years, by parents involved in acrimonious custody disputes.

Confusion about child kidnapping has also been aggravated by the absence of reliable statistics. In the United States, for example, kidnapping is not one of the crimes included in the FBI’s national Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, and individual states and other jurisdictions have rarely made any independent tally of kidnapping statistics. As a result, a national picture of this crime from a law enforcement perspective is unavailable. Although the UK does compile national statistics on child abduction, the figures are slightly skewed by the Principal Crime rule, which stipulates that the crime of child abduction is not statistically recognised if a more serious crime is committed in the course of the abduction. For example, if a child is abducted and then murdered, only one offence of homicide is recorded in the national statistics.

However, despite these issues it is possible to draw a relatively accurate picture of both countries' child abduction environments. Firstly, it must be noted that in Europe and North America kidnapping only accounts for a tiny proportion (typically only around two percent) of all violent crimes against juveniles, and is dwarfed by much more common crimes such as simple and aggravated assault, robbery, theft and sexual offences. In the UK, Home Office statistics state that there were some 1,028 child abductions in England and Wales in 2004/2005. However, it is thought that more than half of these abductions were ‘attempted’ abductions, in other words the abduction was not successfully completed. In the US, the Department of Justice estimates that there are some 200,000 abductions and attempted abductions each year within the United States. However, the majority of these abductions are family kidnappings, committed primarily by parents who, in the course of custodial disputes, take or keep children in violation of court orders. This type of child abduction also accounts for about a quarter of all child kidnapping incidents in the UK.

In terms of stereotypical ‘stranger’ kidnappings, where a non-family member takes a child, the numbers are far lower than one might expect. This type of kidnapping, which is often widely reported in the press, terrifies parents everywhere and is the most psychologically and physically harmful to the child. However, there are only around 60 to 70 successful child abductions at the hands of strangers each year in the UK, accounting for less than eight percent of child abduction incidents. In America, the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children asserts that between 3,000 and 5,000 child abductions occur at the hands of strangers each year. In both countries the majority of stranger abductions are sexually-motivated, and the crime is perpetrated most commonly by males aged between 20 and 39. The offender will also tend to live alone or with their parents, hold a relatively low-paid job and have previous convictions for crimes against children – mostly of a sexual nature. Statistically, the most common abduction mechanism involves the child being lured into a vehicle, although violent abductions are not uncommon. There have also been increasing incidents of offenders impersonating social service officials or health professionals in order to gain access to children. Most perpetrators live near their victims or will have valid reasons for being at the scene of the crime, either through some form of social or work activity, and in many cases the abduction will be simply a crime of opportunity. Statistics for child kidnappings perpetrated by strangers suggest that both teenagers and primary school-age children are targeted and that females are more frequently taken than males.

Although the statistics demonstrate that child abductions are a comparatively rare occurrence, particularly the highly-publicised and feared stranger kidnappings, this will offer little solace to parents affected or bereaved through such incidents. Despite its rarity, the threat does clearly exist and parents will naturally remain concerned for the safety of their children. However, both the threat and worry can be minimised by good security practices. red24 advises parents to instil in their children, at an early age, an awareness of the threat and how to respond to it. Children should be taught never to approach an unknown car or individual, and to run from any stranger who approaches. Parents should also employ an attitude of suspicion when it comes to strangers, and caution should be exercised by parents when allowing unknown individuals access to the home. For further information on child abduction trends, advice on protecting your children and what to do in the event that your child should go missing, please contact a security specialist at red24 for personalised advice.

Peru’s widespread civil unrest

red24 — Wed, 18 Jul 2007 23:07:00 GMT

Over the past week, crippling strikes and demonstrations organised by labour unions and regional protest organisations have paralysed large swathes of Peru. Teachers and farm workers protesting against the economic and social policies of President Alan Garcia’s government have boycotted classes, blocked roads, attacked police and occupied airports and railway stations. Four people have been killed in the nationwide demonstrations and over 300 protestors arrested. The events have rattled Garcia’s government and have serious implications for both his political future and the country’s travel and security environment.

Popular discontent with President Garcia has been growing for some months. Although his administration’s stable macroeconomic management and tight fiscal and monetary policies have continued to build on Peru’s high economic growth and low inflationary rates of the past few years, it has not delivered the promised improvements in terms of employment and poverty reductions. As a consequence, Garcia’s approval rating has plummeted from a high of 60 percent to just 35 percent. It is this environment that has given birth to the recent strikes and demonstrations. On 5 July, the left-wing Peruvian education workers’ union launched an indefinite strike in protest against newly approved government legislation that obliges teachers to take a proficiency test. The government states that the regulation is an essential step to reform Peru’s ailing state education system, but teachers accuse it of being a veiled attempt at privatisation, which will see thousands of teachers arbitrarily sacked. The teachers’ strike acted as a catalyst for further action with Peru’s largest labour group, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) and a farmers’ union, the Campesino Confederation of Peru (CCP), launching their own strikes last week ostensibly in protest against the government’s recent free-trade accord with the United States.

These three strikes and the accompanying demonstrations mobilised tens of thousands of disenfranchised Peruvians dissatisfied with the political and economic status quo. In Peru’s capital, Lima, a reported 30,000 protesters gathered in the city’s streets and plazas last week to demonstrate against the government and pitched battles between the police and the demonstrators occasionally broke out. Similar scenes were witnessed in the northern city of Piura, where around 15,000 protesters took to the streets, and in the central Peruvian town of Tarma. The Pan-American highway was been stormed and blocked at numerous points, and roads around Iquitos, Andahuayas and Puno were also subjected to protest road-blocks. In Arequipa, some 1,100km south east of Lima, protesters obstructed the Arequipa-Puno highway and took nine police officers hostage after they attempted to clear the road. Although they were eventually released, several of the officers were injured after being beaten during their nine-hour ordeal. Tourist infrastructure was also affected. Anti-government protesters blocked the tracks of a train to Machu Picchu and attacked the stricken carriage with stones, and in southern Peru, some 5,000 protesters stormed and occupied Juliaca airport, blocking the runway and forcing the cancellation of flights and a sharp confrontation with police.

Although the CGTP and CCP strikes have now ended, they have, along with the ongoing teachers’ protest, generated significant anti-Garcia sentiment and there is now considerable momentum to the left-leaning protests and tensions are high. Protests continue to occur, as do sporadic roadblocks and incidents of violence. The situation looks likely to remain tense for the foreseeable future, as the government has ruled out negotiations and/or policy changes. Garcia himself is also in a belligerent mood, calling the protesters ‘radical, suicidal and crazy and resentful, fault-finding parasites’. He has deployed 15,000 police throughout the country to control the unrest and has authorised the armed forces to intervene should the situation require it. Given the entrenched positions of both sides, further strikes, demonstrations and unrest look distinctly possible.

Although the protests and demonstrations have not yet directly threatened foreign nationals or foreign interests in Peru, demonstrations intended to be peaceful can quickly and unexpectedly turn confrontational and violent. As consequence, red24 advises that all foreign nationals avoid all protests and remain in their homes or hotels should violent unrest occur. Furthermore, since the timing and routes of scheduled marches and demonstrations are subject to rapid change, red24 advises members in country to monitor local media sources, or to contact red24, for new developments.

Storming of Red Mosque likely to lead to further violence

red24 — Wed, 11 Jul 2007 16:44:00 GMT

At 04:00 local time on 10 July 2007, Pakistani special forces launched ‘Operation Silence’, a military incursion into the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, located in the heart of Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. The operation brought an end to an eight-day stand-off between the Pakistani government and radical students and clergy holed up inside the mosque complex. The fighting, which lasted over 24 hours, saw the security forces meet heavy resistance from militants armed with automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and petrol bombs. The seminary complex, which includes a women’s religious school, was booby-trapped with landmines, and militants also took up firing positions in the mosque’s minarets. Current casualty reports suggest that as many as 50 militants were killed, along with the Mosque’s hard-line cleric, Abdul Rashid Ghazi. A further 80 militants surrendered or were captured. Eight soldiers died in the fighting, and another 29 were wounded. There is currently little news on the fate of hundreds of women and children who were reportedly trapped in the complex during the siege, although at least 50 of them are thought to have escaped during the initial phase of the operation.

Tensions between Pakistan’s government and the Red Mosque have been growing for months. The Mosque, long a hotbed of radicalism and militancy and a consistent supporter of Afghanistan’s Taleban and its opposition to Musharraf’s backing for the US-led ‘war on terror’, has systematically begun to challenge the Pakistan government’s authority over the past six months. In January, female students from the Mosque’s seminary occupied a children’s library and refused to move until the government rebuilt some illegally constructed mosques that it had demolished. Shortly after this episode, Red Mosque clerics demanded the strict enforcement of Sharia law throughout Pakistan, and let loose vigilante morality squads on Islamabad in an effort to ‘prevent vices and promote virtue’. These morality squads threatened music and video shop owners, and kidnapped women accused of prostitution, as well as a number of police officers. Events reached crisis point in June, when students from the mosque abducted seven Chinese nationals they accused of running a brothel, and held them at the compound for over 17 hours. The incident apparently provoked Beijing to make clear to Musharraf that, although it could accept losses in Balochistan and the other tribal areas of Pakistan, it was not prepared to see its citizens abducted and tortured in the heart of Islamabad. The rebuke appears to have stung the Pakistani government into action. By 3 July, the Red Mosque compound was surrounded by security forces and surrender demands were issued to the militants within its walls. After eight days of fruitless negotiations and occasional violent skirmishes in which 21 people lost their lives, Musharraf authorised the decisive incursion.

The raid into the Red Mosque has significant implications, both for Musharraf and for Pakistan’s security environment. The president has recently been fighting for his political survival. His decision in March to remove Pakistan’s top judge, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammed Chaudhry, sparked the most serious opposition protests since he seized power in a military coup in 1999. However, Musharraf’s handling of the Red Mosque crisis, characterised by a measured forcefulness, appears to have been viewed favourably by many in Pakistan and is expected to give him some much needed political breathing space. This respite, though, will be short-lived. Pakistan’s parliamentary elections are on the horizon and a Supreme Court judgement on Chaudhry’s dismissal is only two weeks away, almost guaranteeing that Musharraf’s troubles will re-emerge.

The military assault on the Red Mosque is also highly likely to provoke militant attacks throughout the country. In October 2006, a Pakistani military operation on a madrassa in the Bajaur tribal area of the country, in which at least 80 militants died, triggered a wave of retaliatory militant action that saw terrorist strikes in the North West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Islamabad itself. A similar level of violence can be expected this time around. Extremist elements have vowed to avenge any attack on the Mosque, and there were already signs of Islamist-related violence prior to yesterday’s assault. On 6 July, there were reports of an attempt to shoot down Musharraf’s plane as it took off from Chaklala military airbase in Rawalpindi, and on 8 July three Chinese workers were shot dead and another seriously wounded in the north-western city of Peshawar in a militant attack apparently motivated by the bloody siege in the capital.

The operation against the Red Mosque is a much needed attempt to counter the Islamist militancy currently seeping into Pakistan’s cities from the lawless tribal belt along the Afghan border. The assault looks likely to buy Musharraf some political time, although the Chaudhry saga and impending parliamentary elections will mean that the general will soon be once again walking a tortuous legal and political tightrope. The offensive against the Red Mosque will also create further anti-Musharraf sentiment in various conservative and extremist circles, and as a consequence red24 believes that attacks on government institutions, military installations and foreign interests can be expected across Pakistan. red24 advises all foreign nationals in Pakistan to exercise extreme caution and vigilance at all times, and to avoid non-essential travel to the North West Frontier Province and all travel to the Federally Administered Tribal Area.

Facing a multi-faceted and long-term jihadist threat

red24 — Wed, 4 Jul 2007 16:40:00 GMT

As the 7/7 anniversary approaches, the UK finds itself once again on a high state of alert for terrorism. At 15:15 on 30 June 2007, two men attempted to drive a gas and petrol-laden Jeep Cherokee 4x4 into the main entrance of Terminal 1 at Glasgow International Airport. Although bollards and other obstructions appear to have prevented the vehicle fully penetrating the building itself, it did burst into flames, injuring five people and significantly damaging the terminal’s façade. The attack on Glasgow airport came just 36 hours after police discovered two car bombs in central London. The UK police and intelligence service response to the attempted attacks has been extensive and swift. Nineteen properties have been raided, including addresses in Liverpool, in the village of Houston, Renfrewshire, and in the town of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire. Eight individuals have been detained. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), based at MI5’s Thames House headquarters, raised the UK’s official threat level status from ‘severe’ to ‘critical’. The critical threat level is the highest level on a five-point scale, and indicates that an attack is expected imminently.

Although shocking, the attack on Glasgow airport and the attempted London bombings should surprise no-one. The terror threat to the UK is well-established. The country has long been viewed by al-Qaeda, other militant Islamist groups and young, radicalised, British-born Muslims as a prime target, given its close involvement in the US-led ‘war on terror’. Likewise, the timing of the attempted attacks could also be regarded as predictable. Britain’s recent political power transition was always likely to act as a potential trigger for an attack. Jihadists have, as they demonstrated in 2004 with the Madrid train bombings, attacked countries during periods of political transition in a bid to influence foreign policy. As recently as April 2007, JTAC released a report suggesting that Tony Blair’s departure from office, an event described by al-Qaeda planners as ‘a change at the head of the company’, could invite a terrorist attack.

The Glasgow airport and London terror attempts appear to be the work of foreign jihadists. Of the eight individuals currently detained by police in connection with the attacks, only one appears to have been born in the UK. The rest are reportedly from overseas, and include an Iraqi, a Saudi, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, two Indians and a Lebanese national. Although it is simply speculation at this stage, it is possible that the bombers received some training and instruction from al-Qaeda. Multiple car bombings and suicide attacks are a well-established al-Qaeda tactic, and although both attacks failed, suggesting tactical and technical naivety, the bombers may well have been constrained by the components available to them. Powerful military-grade explosives and munitions used in car bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan are extremely difficult to acquire in the UK, and supplies of peroxide and fertilizer, used in previous UK bomb plots and attacks, are perceived to be more closely watched and regulated than in the past. As a result, those responsible for the Glasgow and London attempts may have been forced to use cruder explosive devices made from gas cylinders, petrol and nails. Such devices have been used before, most notably by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1995 when it attacked the Paris metro, killing eight and wounding 80. However, these devices are also notoriously unreliable. As recently as last summer suspected Lebanese terrorists attempted to set off two propane-based bombs on trains heading for Cologne, Germany, but the detonator failed to ignite the gas. It would appear, thankfully, that a similar failure befell the London car bombers.

The latest attacks also reinforce the fact that the jihadist threat to the UK comes not only from marginalised and impoverished young men but also from highly-educated and middle-class sections of Muslim society. Seven of the eight people so far detained in connection with the attempted attacks are thought to be doctors or medical students, and all have worked for the British National Health Service (NHS). Although the medical revelation is shocking, it is by no means an unheard of phenomenon. Several leading jihadists have medical backgrounds; Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two, is a qualified surgeon, and Mahmoud al-Zahar, co-founder of Hamas, is also a doctor. However, the fact that some jihadists operating in the UK have a medical background does have frightening implications for the UK security environment. As medical professionals these individuals would have had access to, and knowledge of, chemicals, infectious spores and cultures, and radioactive materials. Such substances could be used to create extremely lethal or panic-inducing weapons, and the British police and intelligence services will be anxious to find out whether any of this expertise or material was passed on to other terror cells or organisations.

The British government’s response to the Glasgow airport and London incidents will be carefully calibrated. It will certainly avoid knee-jerk crackdowns or the imposition of draconian measures on local Muslim communities. Such actions would only serve to exacerbate perceptions that the West is engaged in war against Islam and Muslims, and would only encourage further attacks. Instead, the UK government appears likely to place more emphasis on the development of softer security strategies to compliment the traditional ‘hard’ security response. Newly installed prime minister Gordon Brown has already talked of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in the battle against jihadism, and government rhetoric suggests that it is going to encourage and support an intellectual battle against Islamic extremism, challenging radical Imams and their interpretations of the Koran. The government is also likely to tighten entry and practising requirements for foreign Imams, in an attempt to prevent additional extremist preachers from entering the country. Such measures should go some way to eliminate the radicalising environment that produces jihadists in the first place. However, improvements in hard security measures are also likely to be looked at. Border controls need to be improved, and a system that highlights the travel patterns of UK citizens requires development. The government also needs to amend the law on phone-tap evidence; allowing such evidence in trials will increase the conviction rate and reduce the likelihood of terror suspects being placed on inadequate supervision control orders.

However, the UK government faces an enormous task. The country is confronting a long-term and severe terrorist threat which emanates both from al-Qaeda-funded, trained, and directed groups and from local, self-generating, autonomous terror cells. All of these groups are adaptable, innovative, highly motivated and willing to die for their cause. The organisation, training and capabilities of the terrorists are also likely to improve over time. The sheer weight of the threat – Eliza Manningham-Buller, the outgoing head of MI5, said in November 2006 that the service was tracking more than 1,600 known active militants and some 30 terror plots – suggests that the British government’s response will need to be every bit as dedicated, international and multifaceted as the threat that stems from the jihadists themselves. In the immediate future, the terrorist threat remains extremely high. Although the cell responsible for the attempted attacks on 29 and 30 June appears to have been rounded-up, and despite JTAC now reportedly considering a reduction in the national threat level, further attacks cannot be ruled out. Any new security measures will be difficult to implement rapidly, and copycat attacks, perpetrated by individuals or groups unrelated to the cell currently being held, are a possibility.

A Resurgent Tuareg Insurgency?

red24 — Thu, 28 Jun 2007 04:46:00 GMT

On 22 June 2007, militants from a Tuareg rebel group attacked a military garrison in the remote Saharan outpost of Tazerzait, northern Niger. The dawn raid resulted in the deaths of at least 13 government soldiers, the wounding of a further 30 and the capture of 47 more. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ), a recently formed Tuareg militant group that has conducted several other attacks over the past few months. The increase in militant activity has raised fears of a resurgence in the Tuareg rebellion and has significant implications for security in Niger, and may impact on a number of foreign companies and non-governmental organisations operating in Niger's Saharan region.

The Tuaregs are a pastoral, nomadic people who are scattered among a number of West and North African states. In Niger they only make up roughly ten percent of the total population, but in the northern, desert regions of the country, specifically Aïr and Azawad, they constitute a clear majority. However, since Niger declared independence from France in 1960, the Tuareg people have become physically, politically, economically and socially marginalised from the country’s centre of power. With Niger’s various other ethnic groups dominating the government, the Tuaregs have, at times, been oppressed and subjugated. In the early 1990s, Tuareg anger and resentment toward their situation gave rise to a number of militant separatist groups who waged a violent campaign against the Niger state that claimed the lives of thousands before a comprehensive peace accord was signed in 1998. However, the security and stability brought about by this peace agreement now appears to be waning.

In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that discontent among the Tuareg population is once again on the rise. The economic development and decentralisation of political power promised in the 1998 agreement has not materialised, and the Tuareg population remains as disadvantaged as ever. In northern Niger, the burgeoning uranium mining and oil exploration industries have not brought regional prosperity, only serious ecological and health problems. The growing levels of popular dissatisfaction among the Tuareg population is what lead to the establishment of the MNJ. Sources on the ground suggest that the group is largely made up of veteran Tuareg militants, who were integrated into the Niger military under the terms of the 1998 agreement and subsequently defected. Led by a militant called Aghaly ag Alambo, the MNJ wants the Niger government to grant the Tuareg people greater rights and autonomy, as well as a share of the wealth from the northern region’s emergent resource exploitation industries. Armed with light weapons and using classic guerilla warfare the MNJ has become increasingly active over the past six months:

In February, it attacked an army base in the northern oasis town of Iferouane.
In March, its members attacked a bus carrying Niger soldiers, sparking an all-night gun battle. Anti-personnel mines laid by the group also claimed the lives of two Niger soldiers in the northern Agadez province.
In April, some 30 MNJ fighters attacked Niger’s largest uranium mine, run by French nuclear energy group Areva, killing one local security guard and wounding three others.
On 17 June, about 20 MNJ rebels attacked the international airport in Agadez, 740km northeast of the capital, Niamey. The attack was an attempt to destroy military reconnaissance planes. However, the hit-and-run attack was repelled by security forces and the airport suffered no casualties or significant damage.
As these attacks and the recent Tazerzait raid demonstrate, the MNJ is an increasingly confident, capable and lethal group. Not only has it attacked Niger military targets with coordination and determination, but it has also shown a willingness to strike aggressively at foreign targets. The MNJ’s capabilities have also recently been strengthened by the theft of some 9,600 rounds of ammunition, 39 light and heavy weapons, and 30 grenades from a government armoury in the Agadez region. At the same time, the Niger government’s response to the MNJ and its activities is likely only to invite further attacks. Niger President Mamadou Tandja has refused to recognize or negotiate with the MNJ, labeling its members as ‘criminals, drug traffickers and bandits’. This move will serve only to further antagonize the rebels and will have removed any incentive for restraint and moderation on their part. Additionally, Tandja’s decision to send military reinforcements to Niger’s northern territories and to provide more than US$60 million in additional funds to counter the group is likely in the medium-to-long term to drive the MNJ to attack ‘softer’ targets, such as foreign companies and personnel.

Tandja’s decision to pressure the group may well bare fruit, but there is also the possibility that the MNJ will mirror the tactics of militants in Nigeria and begin abducting foreign nationals in order to pressure the government in Niamey. A resurgent Tuareg insurgency in Niger also has the potential to destabilise the wider region. Mali, a landlocked former French colony to the west of Niger, has also faced Tuareg rebellions in the past. With a history of cross-border collaboration between various Tuareg militant groups, any Tuareg rebel renaissance in Niger could spill over into Mali, triggering a repeat of the race riots and violence which blighted eastern Mali throughout the 1990s. Ominously, MNJ rebels and Malian Tuaregs recently cooperated in an attack on a Malian police outpost, killing one gendarme and wounded five others.

The combination of widespread Tuareg discontent, a highly motivated and increasingly capable Tuareg insurgent group, and the Niger government’s entrenched political position suggests that a protracted, and possibly bloody, conflict in northern Niger is now highly likely, and may even spread to neighbouring countries. Due to the ongoing, and increasing, risk of violence, red24 advises against all non-essential travel to the northern parts of Niger, especially close to the border with Chad, Algeria and Mali.

Rio de Janeiro – No end to the gang violence?

red24 — Wed, 20 Jun 2007 15:03:00 GMT

On 14 June, more than 400 military and federal police officers from Brazil’s elite security forces raided the German Complex, a sprawling slum located just twenty minutes from downtown Rio de Janeiro. The officers, clad in combat gear and carrying assault rifles, sealed off access to the area, conducted searches of men, women and children, and arrested a number of drug gang members. The raid was part of a month-long operation, dubbed ‘Wide Siege’, which aims to curb drug- and gun-trafficking in Rio de Janeiro, and reduce the level of violence ahead of the Pan American Games to be held in the city next month. However, the Brazilian government’s aggressive tactics do not guarantee success and even run the risk of provoking Rio’s various drug gangs into launching a wave of anarchic violence across the city.

Rio de Janeiro is one of the world’s most violent cities. Statistically, the postcard-perfect South American metropolis is more lethal for young males than the occupied Palestinian territories. Rampant poverty, a huge (and growing) gap between rich and poor, an abundance of guns and drugs, and an underfunded, poorly trained and often corrupt police force have all conspired to drive Rio toward the top of the world’s homicide rankings. However, even by Rio’s standards, 2007 has been an exceptionally violent year; there were some 1,300 murders in the city in the first three months of the year alone. Although much of the violence is confined to the slums, or favelas, in which the gangs reside, recent months have seen increasing incidents of violence spilling out into the heart of the city itself.

The various drug gangs, be it the Comando Vermelho (CV, Red Command), Amigos dos Amigos (ADA, Friends of Friends) or Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP, The Third Command), are largely responsible for the increase in violent crime. Well-armed, well-funded and highly-motivated, the gangs compete for and oversee the majority of criminal activity in Rio. They base themselves in the favelas, where their power extends to the point that they decide when the garbage is collected, when shops open and who should die for breaking their rules. The favelas provide the gangs with a safe environment in which to operate, and the slums' impoverished nature provides a ready supply of willing recruits.

In order to counter the increasing violence in the city ahead of the Pan American Games, Rio de Janeiro’s recently-elected state governor, Sergio Cabral, has taken a hard and uncompromising line. He has drafted in the federal police and the military, and has used the security forces to encircle various favelas and erect security cordons. The police and military have conducted incursions, seizing weapons and drugs and arresting gang members. However, the raids have thus far produced only mixed results. Daily gun battles between the drug gangs and security forces now blight the favelas. The gangs have responded by barricading the entrances to favelas with burnt cars, blowing up sewage pipes to create trenches, and building concrete fortresses to deter fuller, more long-term incursions. Although numerous gang members have been killed or detained by the authorities, the gangs remain embedded within the slum communities.

Having resisted the security forces’ initial push, there is now a possibility that having come under this pressure the gangs will begin violently striking out into central Rio. A similar crackdown on the gangs in February, just before the Carnival, in which the security forces successfully disrupted the supply of drugs to traffickers in the city, saw crime rapidly escalate as the gang leaders ordered their foot soldiers to mug, steal and rob in order to make up for the revenue shortfall. Furthermore, having come under this pressure, the gangs may feel the need to organize a show of force. The CV, ADA and TCP are essentially gangs composed of loose alliances and have weak chains of command. The sustained security offensive by the authorities could therefore provoke the gangs into orchestrating civil unrest, indiscriminate violence and other symbolic acts in order to protect their reputations, enforce contracts and hold on to allies. The Pan American Games provide an ideal opportunity for such actions and the violence Rio witnessed in December 2006 could well be a taste of what is to come. Then the gangs coordinated a terror campaign across the city. Policemen were assassinated, buses and banks firebombed, and innocent civilians murdered. The gangs are already rumoured to have ordered the killing of 150 security officers as a response to Cabral’s crackdown, and attacks on civilian and tourist targets cannot be ruled out.

Cabral’s crackdown on Rio de Janerio’s drug gangs is a much needed initiative in a city wracked by violent lawlessness. However, the government's current strategy to aggressively starve the gangs of drugs, weapons and money, combined with its apparent failure to actually rid the favelas of these influences, threatens to trigger a wave of gang-inspired criminality and violence across the city. This could have disastrous consequences at a time when large numbers of visitors are about to descend on the city for the Pan American Games.

ETA ends ceasefire

red24 — Wed, 13 Jun 2007 15:28:00 GMT

On 5 June 2007, the armed Basque separatist group Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) announced an end to its 15-month-long ceasefire and warned that it would now be ‘active on all fronts to defend the Basque homeland’. In a communiqué sent to two pro-independence Basque newspapers, Berria and Gara, ETA laid the blame for its decision to return to violence squarely on Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero, who they said had abandoned the peace process and instigated ‘arrests, tortures and every type of persecution’ against the Basque people. The collapse of the ceasefire has dashed hopes of resolving the separatist conflict and raises the spectre of a new wave of ETA-orchestrated terror attacks.

ETA has been fighting for over 40 years to establish an independent, possibly Marxist, Basque state encompassing the mountainous north eastern Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra and the south western French departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra and Soule. Although it claims to fight for the independence of the whole Basque region, ETA has focused its activities primarily on the Spanish side of the border. The organisation’s separatist campaign adopted the tactics of bombing, assassination, rocket attacks, kidnapping, extortion, harassment and intimidation, and since it was founded in 1959, the group has killed over 800 people and has become recognised as one of Europe’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. However, ETA has become increasingly weakened in recent times. Improved cooperation between the Spanish and French authorities has seen hundreds of ETA operatives arrested and detained. In addition, national revulsion in Spain toward all forms of terrorism in the wake of the 2004 Madrid bombings, in which 191 people were killed, has further drained the group of support. Increasingly marginalised, ETA announced a ‘permanent ceasefire’ in March 2006, signalling a desire to engage with the government in Madrid and to begin Northern Ireland-like peace negotiations.

Although the ceasefire brought a general reduction in ETA-inspired violence, the group continued to wage a limited terrorism campaign, harassing and intimidating those opposed to its separatist aims, extorting money from Basque businesses and carrying out robberies and other thefts. The group announced the termination of the ceasefire last week ostensibly as a result of the Spanish government’s refusal to lift an official ban on ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, from contesting local elections at the end of last month. However, ETA’s truce with the Spanish government essentially ended on 30 December 2006, when it detonated a large car bomb at an underground car park at Madrid’s Barajas International Airport, killing two Ecuadorian immigrants and destroying three of the building's four storeys. Despite stating that the bombing was not intended to kill and was meant only as a warning to the Spanish government, the attack demonstrated ETA's ambivalence toward the peace process, and, as a consequence, the group’s recent declaration of a return to violence is relatively unsurprising.

ETA's announcement immediately sparked a flurry of speculation about a new wave of terrorist attacks. The Spanish media quoted reports from Spain’s National Police, Civil Guard and National Intelligence Centre that multiple and varied sources suggested that a resumption of ETA-orchestrated political violence was ‘imminent’ and that a significant attack was likely to occur before August. It is certainly the case that with the tourist season about to start, ETA will have a target-rich environment in which to operate, and it is also the case that although ETA is no longer the force it once was, it remains well positioned to resume its violent campaign. The group continues to have active units in position throughout the country, with Spanish military intelligence estimating that it may have as many as five ‘mobile commando’ units on standby, and the ceasefire has enabled it to re-energise, regroup and rearm. It is reported to have markedly improved its logistical and technical capacity to make explosive devices, and its weapon stocks have been significantly bolstered after it stole 350 pistols from a French arms depot last October. In addition, ETA’s continued extortion operations have financially reinvigorated its organisational infrastructure. As such, it poses a credible threat to Spain’s security environment.

ETA attacks are likely to occur this summer and in the run-up to next year’s general election. Previous ceasefire collapses have traditionally resulted in a quick resumption of ETA attacks, and the ending of the latest ceasefire is likely to be no different. However, red24 does not envisage a return to large-scale attacks designed to cause multiple casualties. The 2004 Madrid bombings seriously weakened support for such tactics, and, as a result, ETA’s attacks are likely to be small in scale, preceded by a warning and aimed at causing damage rather than loss of life. The tourism trade is a high probability target, as striking this industry will increase the economic and political pressure on Madrid. Attacks on multinational business organisations also cannot be ruled out for similar reasons. Sources also suggest that Spanish security officials believe that Madrid and Valencia are also likely targets. Valencia, in particular, may attract ETA’s attention as it is about to host the 32nd Americas Cup yachting race – a potentially high-profile, publicity-generating target. red24 has increased Spain’s terrorism/conflict rating to high to reflect the risk of ETA terrorism in the coming months. Accordingly, all travellers to Spain are advised to exercise caution and vigilance at all times, and to report any suspicious objects, people or activity to security forces immediately.

The implications of a Turkish incursion into Iraq

red24 — Thu, 7 Jun 2007 16:01:00 GMT

Unconfirmed reports on 6 June that Turkey had deployed several hundred troops into northern Iraq on a cross-border counter-terrorism operation against Kurdish militants have fuelled concerns that Turkey is planning an imminent and significant incursion into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Although Turkey has denied that any such raid has taken place, regional unease over Turkish strategy had already grown in recent weeks following a build-up of troops and equipment along the Turkey-Iraq border and the statement by Turkey’s military chief, General Yasar Buyukanit, on 31 May that the army was ready for an offensive in northern Iraq and was simply waiting for orders to proceed. Although Turkey traditionally surges troops into the border region at this time of year in an effort to avert the Kurdish militants’ spring offensive, Turkish rhetoric suggests that there may be a more aggressive deployment this time round.

Turkey has been struggling with a Kurdish separatist insurgency since the early 1980s. Confrontations between the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state have left tens of thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. Although the conflict has, for the most part at least, been restricted to the country’s south east, Kurdish militants have consistently demonstrated their ability and desire to strike throughout the country. In the past 18 months, PKK-orchestrated attacks in cities across Turkey have claimed more than 100 lives, and just last month a PKK suicide bomber killed six and wounded more than 90 in an attack at a shopping mall in the capital, Ankara. Such attacks have often triggered military reprisals on PKK bases in south eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. However, despite these operations and despite the fact that 1,000 Turkish troops remain stationed as monitors in northern Iraq, Turkish security forces appear unable to eliminate the PKK threat, and a major incursion into northern Iraq, as Turkey undertook in 1997, is not likely to resolve the issue or even significantly reduce the threat posed by the PKK.

At the heart of the Kurdish separatist movement is widespread discontent with what is perceived to be the Turkish government’s discriminatory attitudes and policies toward the Kurdish community. As a consequence, it is unlikely that military action against the PKK in Iraq, action that will inevitably result in further civilian casualties and population displacement, will improve the Turkish security environment. In fact, any military incursion into northern Iraq is likely simply to increase support for the PKK and fuel future terrorist attacks. The PKK has already demonstrated its ability to strike all over Turkey, and if it feels pressured by Turkish military action, it may well launch retaliatory strikes in order to undermine confidence in the military’s ability to contain the PKK's operations.

A retaliatory bombing campaign is certainly not the only ramification. Northern Iraq is currently one of the few parts of the country with a modicum of stability. A large Turkish incursion into the north could potentially destabilise the Kurdish zone and provide al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups with an enlarged operational theatre, further jeopardising regional stability. This would not only threaten US interests and the security of neighbouring Iran and Syria, but also Turkey itself.

Considering the possible ramifications of a significant Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, it will be hoped that the Turkey’s civilian leadership will contain the military’s aggressive impulses. However, Turkey’s current political situation is such that there can be no guarantees. Recent mass rallies protesting against perceived efforts by the government to undermine Turkey’s secular underpinnings and replace them with Islamist values have significantly weakened the government, forcing Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to call early elections, now scheduled for 22 July. Meanwhile, the military, which has traditionally been politically influential in Turkey, has stated that it will intervene should Erdogan continue to threaten Turkey’s secular nature. As a result, it is feared that the government may be tempted to appease the military by giving it the go-ahead for an aggressive incursion into northern Iraq, particularly since such a move would likely distract the Turkish electorate from recent constitutional controversies and would demonstrate the government’s security credentials and its desire to bring about a swift resolution to the Kurdish conflict.

However, a major military incursion into northern Iraq, although possible, appears unlikely at this stage. Given the possible negative repercussions, both regionally and domestically, as well as the vocal opposition of the United States, a NATO ally, a military incursion by Turkey is potentially more useful as a threat rather than as a deed - especially as a distraction from the current political instability in Turkey. However, this is not to suggest that limited cross-border operations will not occur. Artillery strikes and small incursions will continue to take place, and, as a result, terrorist attacks by the PKK are likely to continue and may even escalate.

Despite the high risk from terrorism and conflict in Turkey, red24 does not advise against travel to the country. We do, however, advise that you increase vigilance and maintain awareness of your surroundings at all times. red24 advises against all non-essential travel to the predominantly Kurdish south east, especially along the border areas with Iran and Iraq, given the low-level conflict between Kurdish militants and the Turkish army, especially with the current risk that an escalation in the conflict may include northern Iraq.

Unrest in Karachi

red24 — Thu, 17 May 2007 15:20:00 GMT

On 14 May 2007, a general strike closed banks, shops, markets and schools throughout Karachi, paralysing the Pakistani port city. Similar scenes could be witnessed in towns and cities throughout southern Sindh province, of which Karachi is the capital, as well as in Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta. The strike, called for by opposition groups, was in protest against President General Pervez Musharraf's handling of riots in Karachi over the weekend of 12 May. Clashes between supporters of the pro-government Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and supporters of the opposition Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) resulted in the deaths of 41 people and injured a further 150. The violence in Karachi, perhaps the most serious politically inspired violence in Pakistan for 20 years, combined with the subsequent strike, has seriously weakened Musharraf's hold on power.

Political unrest in Karachi, and Pakistan as a whole, has been growing for some time. Musharraf's apparent unwillingness to guide the country toward a democratic future and his inability to deliver prosperity and stability for the Pakistani people has rendered him immensely unpopular. However, it was Musharraf's decision on 9 March to suspend one of Pakistan's most senior and influential judges, Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, over unspecified accusations of misconduct that galvanised opposition to his rule. It was a decision that was perceived by many of Pakistan's 158 million citizens as an attempt by Musharraf to remove an independently minded judge and to weaken the judicial system ahead of an attempt to extend his five-year term of office later this year, a move that would undoubtedly involve a legal challenge, particularly if he also sought to retain his position as army chief. Opposition supporters and an outraged judiciary soon took to the streets. Pro-Chaudhry anti-Musharraf protests spread throughout the country. Chaudhry addressed increasingly large rallies in Islamabad and Lahore, and another rally in Karachi, Pakistan's financial centre, was planned for 12 May. It was a protest that was always likely to invite violent confrontation.

The pro-government MQM has been increasingly active in Karachi in recent weeks. Earlier in the month it organised a rally to condemn religious militants; to support Musharraf and his involvement in the US-led 'war on terror'; and to criticise the activities of Chaudhry. The group arranged a second rally to coincide with Chaudhry's arrival in the city, a move many believe was orchestrated by Islamabad. This theory gained credence when Pakistani security forces did little to intervene when MQM supporters clashed violently, repeatedly and inevitably with pro-Chaudhry anti-Musharraf protesters from the ARD and MMA.

If Musharraf did foment the violence in the hope that the ensuing instability would pressure Chaudhry and anti-government protesters to tone down their campaign and that some degree of calm would be restored to Pakistan, it was a grave miscalculation. Firstly, the riots have unleashed the forces of sectarianism on the city of Karachi. The MQM is an aggressive, largely Muhajir pressure group. It has a track record of battling competing ethnic groups, particularly Punjabis and Pashtuns, and was largely responsible for the wave of inter-ethnic rioting and violence that blighted Karachi in the 1980s and 1990s. The movement’s actions on the weekend, where it reportedly began rounding up and executing Pashtuns or Punjabis, will have re-awakened the city's ethnic wounds - reprisal killings and further sectarian violence are now a very real possibility.

The rioting has also severely weakened Musharraf and has emboldened the opposition. With resentment toward Musharraf already high in Balochistan and in the North-West Frontier provinces of Pakistan for his support of the US and its war on terror, Pakistan's generals and Musharraf's political allies will be alarmed at the erosion of support for the president in Sindh and Punjab and at the president's inability to ensure stability in those areas. Leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League Party, which has acted as a civilian appendage to the military, have already started to distance themselves from Musharraf, as has the military.

The Karachi riots have not only opened Karachi's sectarian wounds, but also mark the beginning of the end for President General Pervez Musharraf. With support haemorrhaging away and with the opposition increasingly self-assured and belligerent, Musharraf is in a tight corner. His only means of survival now is to make concessions. Reinstating Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, standing down as army chief and striking a deal with Pakistan's main opposition group, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), for joint governance may be the only way for Musharraf to cling to power. Perhaps the best Musharraf can hope for is to be able to play a role in Pakistan’s transition from military rule to democracy during the general election scheduled for early 2008. If he fails to make such concessions, further unrest and violence is highly likely and Musharraf will risk being quickly pressured by the army generals to step aside in the interest of safeguarding the authority of the military establishment.

Elections in the Philippines – A catalyst for violence

red24 — Wed, 9 May 2007 17:22:00 GMT

On 14 May 2007, 45 million Filipinos will go to the polls to vote in mid-term legislative and local elections. The polls, contested by nearly 87,000 candidates, are being touted as a referendum on President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s governance. At stake in the national legislative elections are twelve out of the 24 seats in the national Senate (successful candidates are elected on six-year terms) and all 236 seats in the House of Representatives (elected on three year terms). The local elections will determine 17,000 offices, including provincial governorships, council seats and mayoral positions. The result of the elections will determine whether Arroyo will be able to survive until her presidential term ends in 2010. However, the recent election period in the Philippines has been marred by violence. Yesterday, an aide to a gubernatorial candidate in Compostela Valley, a province 960 km south east of Manila, was shot and killed at his home. The man’s daughter was also wounded in the attack. This incident exemplifies the election-inspired deterioration in the Philippines’ security environment over the past four months and brings the total number of people killed this year in election-related violence to 100. It is highly likely that this death toll will increase as the election approaches and political rivalries intensify, and that the violence will escalate throughout the country and reach its zenith on election day itself.

Election-related violence is not a new phenomenon in the Philippines. Politics in this Southeast Asian country has long been characterised by the three ‘G’s’ – guns, goons and gold. This volatile brew conspires to create an electoral scene that is notorious by international standards for its violence. In elections held between 1986 and 2001, over 750 people lost their lives in poll-related violence, and in the last elections in 2004, 250 election-related violent incidents saw almost 200 people lose their lives and a further 280 wounded. Sadly, this year’s election demonstrates a continuation of this destructive and depressing trend.

The election violence in the Philippines is a result of strong clan rivalries, competition for lucrative public positions, a pervasive gun culture and the existence of communist and Islamist insurgencies. Clans and political dynasties dominate the Philippines’ political scene. The feudal nature of this political environment lends itself to bitter, entrenched rivalries and competition; disagreements and feuds between candidates and their backers often turn violent. This dynamic is particularly acute in the local elections, a component of the democratic process that accounts for a significant proportion of Monday’s poll. The stakes in such local ballots are extremely high. The spoils for winning local political office are massive in the Philippines – local office brings power, prestige, money and connections – and the rewards will only increase as the country’s fiscal decentralisation gathers pace. As a consequence, it is little wonder that elections in the Philippines are bitterly contested affairs.

Adding to the potential for violence is the fact that many political candidates in the Philippines employ ‘private armies’, ostensibly to provide protection for themselves and their families. Large numbers of weapons and men also lends a certain degree of prestige to candidates, who, with their cavalcades of blacked-out SUVs and large private armies, are often regarded as symbols of power and influence. However, these private armies are also deployed by politicians in order to intimidate or eliminate rivals and coerce the electorate.

Compounding the problem of these private armies is the proliferation of what the Philippine police call ‘loose firearms’ across the country. Although President Arroyo and her government has attempted to curb gun use over the election period by introducing a nationwide gun ban enforced by 24 hour roadblocks, the problem is so large that it is almost impossible to overcome. To start with, there are more than 800,000 licensed gun owners in the country, and there are millions more illegal firearms in circulation. Since the start of the election period and the gun ban, the police have detained more than 2,000 violators and seized more than 1,700 firearms, 60 grenades and 50 improvised explosive devices.

The smouldering communist insurgency and Islamist separatist movements in the southern Philippines also add another dimension to the country’s fractious security environment in the run-up to the elections. Both insurgency movements have contributed to electoral violence and disruption since the late 1980s. Their aim is to undermine the state’s authority by sabotaging the democratic process and to demonstrate their continued resilience in the face of the authority’s counter-terrorism efforts. The main communist insurgent group, the New People’s Army, has a track record of assassinating candidates that have a law enforcement or military background, and of extorting fees for safe access to rebel territory (popularly called the PTC or ‘permit to campaign’). There have already been reports of such incidents during this election, and such activities are likely to be stepped up in the coming days. Islamist terror groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group can also be expected to target the elections, which provide both a target-rich environment and a high-profile opportunity to demonstrate their robustness in the face of military activity. The bombing of a market on 8 May in the city of Tacurong, on Mindanao island, in which at least eight people were killed and some 30 wounded, gives an indication of the type of violence that the Philippines may witness in the next few days.

Given the feudal nature of the political environment, the high stakes involved, the presence of private armies, the easy availability of weaponry and the existence of two ideologically-based insurgency campaigns, it is little wonder that the Philippines has long suffered from election-related violence. Considering the importance of this election and the spate of recent attacks, this year’s elections appear highly likely to be particularly intense, and the violent incident rate and death toll is liable to exceed that of 2004. In the long-term, the political violence will die down. However, the risk of indiscriminate terrorist attacks will remain.

The rise of the anti-Putin movement

red24 — Thu, 12 Apr 2007 15:55:00 GMT

On 14 April 2007, various Russian opposition groups will hold a large rally in central Moscow to protest against President Vladimir Putin and his government. Another so-called ‘Dissenters March’ will take place a day later in St Petersburg. These two rallies are the latest in a series of anti-Putin demonstrations. On 3 March 2007, over 5,000 anti-Putin protesters marched through Nevsky Prospekt, St Petersburg’s central boulevard, and on 24 March, demonstrators defied a ban and marched in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia’s fourth largest city, to protest against his administration. The rallies have been organised by ‘The Other Russia’, a diverse coalition of opposition groups hostile to the Kremlin and alarmed by what they see as Vladimir Putin’s increasing authoritarianism. The coalition includes the United Civil Front movement led by chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov, the Popular Democratic Union party headed by former Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, and the National Bolshevik party. The strength and number of protests in recent months illustrate the growing domestic unease with Vladimir Putin’s leadership and suggests that the run-up to parliamentary elections in December 2007 and to presidential elections in March 2008 will not be incident-free.

At first glance, it is difficult to understand why Putin is the subject of internal hostility. Since coming to power in 2000, Putin has turned Russia around. He inherited a country from Boris Yeltsin that was wracked by political and economic chaos and has managed to bring about stability and development. His strict macroeconomic management, combined with the high price of oil, has delivered seven successive years of strong economic growth for the country. He has managed to pay off Russia’s US$22 billion foreign debt and most foreign exchange controls have been abolished. Wages and living standards are rising throughout the country and a middle class has begun to emerge, even in the provinces. However, the political liberalisation that is often thought to accompany economic success has not materialised.

In fact, Russia has witnessed a gradual erosion of political and civil freedom during Putin’s tenure. His seven years in office have been characterised by efforts to centralise and consolidate power. Putin has attempted to sideline, co-opt and crush all serious opposition to his administration. For example, potential political rival Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly the super-rich controller of Russian petroleum company YUKOS, is currently serving time in a Siberian prison on allegedly trumped-up tax evasion and fraud charges, while another potential threat to Putin, billionaire Boris Berezovsky, fled to London after fearing for his life in Russia. The Kremlin has also attempted to neuter opposition parties. Recent Kremlin-initiated legislation stipulates that Russian political parties, if they are to be recognised, need to have a minimum of 50,000 members and need to be represented in half of the country’s provinces. In March 2007, Russia’s Supreme Court invoked these regulations and closed down the Republican Party, the Russian Peace Party and the Nationalist Bolshevik Party, all players within ‘The Other Russia’ coalition. Sources within the Russia election registration office also state that the Supreme Court is likely to outlaw five other political parties within the next few months. The Kremlin states that these regulations are designed simply to streamline the country’s untidy political scene. However, critics argue that it is a mechanism to stifle the opposition. Putin has also moved against the media. Apart from a few Moscow-based newspapers, the relatively free media of the 1990s has been replaced by supine institutions that are controlled by the state or by Kremlin-friendly businesses. Reporting of opposition parties is largely non-existent and the multitude of coverage of Putin and his ministers is almost entirely uncritical.

Democracy in Russia has now been rolled back to the extent that the country today has very much the look and feel of a new Soviet Union. The socialist ideology may have changed, but the old Soviet centralisation of power remains. In such a climate, it is unsurprising that people are taking to the streets. However, such popular protests have not gone unnoticed by Putin and his administration. On 4 April, Moscow’s pro-Kremlin city council passed legislation restricting the number of people allowed to take part in political rallies to two per square metre. Demonstrators are also banned from gathering in front of historic monuments and from holding indoor meetings if there are more people than chairs. The legislation is likely to be adopted by other pro-Kremlin city councils and effectively renders street protests and large internal rallies illegal. Although ‘The Other Russia’ coalition has already stated its intent to defy the ban, future protests are likely to provoke a draconian response from the state’s security apparatus.

Although Putin has moved to suppress opposition activity in Russia and will step up such activity as he looks to consolidate enough political and economic power to hand over the country confidently (his second presidential term ends in March 2008), it is likely that his actions will only encourage further large-scale protests against him. By choking the opposition and controlling the media, Putin drives disenfranchised elements of Russian society to the streets, the only remaining avenue Russians have to express political dissatisfaction. Moves now to disrupt or prevent such demonstrations will simply serve to further antagonise the anti-Putin movement and may push protesters to employ more extreme tactics. However, although opposition protests will continue to occur and may intensify over the next 10-12 months, they do not have the potential to threaten Putin or the stability of the Russian Federation. Despite his increasing authoritarianism, Putin maintains a high level of public support in Russia, consistently achieving approval ratings of 75-80 percent, and can call on a formidable state security apparatus to contain or crush any internal dissent. 2007 should witness several large-scale protests against Putin’s government and several are likely to turn violent. However, these demonstrations are unlikely to bring about any change in Russia’s civil structure or democratic process.

Elections amid uncertainty

red24 — Wed, 4 Apr 2007 23:29:00 GMT

Campaigning is currently underway ahead of East Timor's 9 April 2007 presidential election. The country's prime minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, is seen as the favourite to win but he faces stiff competition from seven other candidates, with the current president, Xanana Gusmao, not standing for re-election. This will be the country's second presidential election since gaining independence from Indonesia. The situation in the country is a far cry from that during the last elections in 2002 when the country was looking forward to full independence and a promising future. Five years later the young country's future is far from certain.

Today, order and stability have become elusive. Clashes between rival gangs are common, and refugee camps are now home to thousands of East Timorese. International peacekeepers are once again patrolling the streets, though they have themselves become a source of tension in the country after accusations that they killed two East Timorese men without provocation in an incident during February. Rebel soldiers have become a serious security issue in the run-up to the elections, with concerns raised that they may disrupt the voting process. Alfredo Reinado, the leader of the rebel soldiers, has now become a cult figure in the country and is enjoying growing popular support - especially after an unsuccessful attempt by Australian peacekeepers to capture him in early March 2007. The raid prompted hundreds of young men to show their support for Reinado by blockading roads in the capital, Dili, with burning tyres and cement blocks, forcing President Gusmao to give international peacekeepers emergency powers to quell the unrest. This ongoing instability and violence has lead to growing concerns over East Timor's future.

Yet, less than a year ago few would have predicted this situation. Problems only began to emerge in April 2006, when former-prime minister Mari Alkatiri dismissed 600 soldiers from the country's fledgling 1,400-member military, amid a strike over perceived discrimination in pay and working conditions. It was Alkatiri's mishandling of this volatile situation that led to the rapid collapse of civil order around Dili, spreading throughout the country.

On its own the dismissal of those 600 soldiers (many of whom are now members of Reinado's rebels) should not have had the impact it did. Instead, it appears to have been the spark behind growing dissatisfaction and tensions within East Timor, problems that were far from evident before. Civil order collapsed amid violent demonstrations and resulted in the displacement of thousands of people. Rival gangs clashed over territory, and launched attacks on refugee camps. Fighting broke out among opposing factions within the police and military, and divisions between people from the east of the island (Lorosae) and those from the west (Loromonu) soon emerged as a factor in the violence. The widespread rioting and fighting after the dismissal, which eventually left 37 people dead and displaced more than 150,000 others, prompted the return of Australian-led international peacekeepers - less than a year after the end of the six-year United Nations (UN) mission to the country.

The ongoing instability has cast serious doubts on the success of the upcoming elections. The election campaign has already been marred by violence, with clashes between members of rival political parties on 29 March in Viqueque, a town 220km from Dili, during a campaign rally by Jose Ramos-Horta. Further violence is likely, especially on election day, despite efforts by international peacekeepers. However, the greatest concern is not that there may be violence around these elections, but that even with a successful election the country's current problems are unlikely to be easily resolved.

The underlying sources of the current instability, including poverty, inequality and ethnic divisions, will take many years and an effective, popular government to address properly. This, however, is nonetheless attainable. Economically, East Timor holds great potential, with rich offshore natural gas resources only recently being tapped. Politically, the current prime minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, and the current president, Xanana Gusmao, have already proven to be a popular and respected team. Ramos-Horta will in all likelihood win the presidential election, while Gusmao has stated that he will postpone his retirement to run for prime minister later this year. If both are successful, the foundation for a respected and effective government will be in place.

In the long-term, a solution to East Timor's current instability will have to come from within and cannot be provided by ongoing interventions by the international community. The 9 April election amid incredible uncertainty and under the threat of further violence, is the best hope that East Timor has to find such a solution.

A renewed battlefield?

red24 — Thu, 29 Mar 2007 14:49:00 GMT

On 26 March, shortly before 01:00 local time, two light aircraft (one according to the government) belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Ealam (LTTE) dropped several bombs on Sri Lanka's Katunayake air force base situated next to Colombo international airport. Three airmen were killed and 16 others injured in the attack, which forced the temporary closure of the airport and caused Sri Lanka's stock market to fall by 1.3 percent. After launching the attack, the rebels managed to turn around and fly back from where they came, presumably an airstrip in the north. Shortly after the air strike a pro-LTTE Tamil website, Tamilnet, released a number of photos showing pilots in blue tiger-stripped uniforms alongside rebel leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Also shown were pictures of the aircraft with bombs attached to the fuselage. The LTTE's newfound status as an air power adds a new dimension to the conflict. However, the group will struggle to replicate attacks such as this, and the nature of the conflict is unlikely to change much. The attacks nevertheless constitute a psychological victory for the LTTE and will boost their spirits in the short-term.

The LTTE, or Tamil Tigers, has proven itself an able insurgent group since 1983, when it started its armed campaign against the majority Sinhalese-led government. The rebels' quest for an independent homeland for the ethnic Tamil minority has seen them control large swathes of land in the north and the east of the country. The LTTE has assassinated heads of state from Sri Lanka and India and is the only insurgent group in the world to boast a naval wing, the Sea Tigers. The rebels have now confirmed what Sri Lankan intelligence operatives have suspected for some time, the existence of a basic air force.

The Tigers’ air force has raised a number of concerns within Sri Lanka's military establishment. Chief among these is the possibility that this development may change the traditional borders of the war from the historically conflict-prone north and east to the rest of the country. Previously the rebels have been able only to strike areas outside of the conflict zone via their suicide bomber cadres. That the aircraft not only managed to travel undetected all the way from rebel-held north of the country to the airbase, some 36km north of Colombo, but also managed to return unscathed, has raised questions over the Sri Lankan military's ability to counter an air threat. There is also concern that the rebels will now have access to a number of previously unrealistic targets, such as the residences and offices of prominent figures, naval installations out at sea and heavily guarded military targets.

Although there is no doubting the significance of this air strike by the Tigers, it is important to analyse the group's air capability and the likelihood of success in using it. The rebels are estimated by Sri Lankan intelligence agencies to possess two light aircraft and two small helicopters. These aircraft have been modified to include improvised explosives. The group has also developed two airstrips in the north, both of which have been targeted in bombing campaigns by the Sri Lankan air force in recent years. It should also be noted that the rebels are likely to only launch attacks at night to reduce the chances of being detected and shot down by anti-aircraft systems.

Although rebel spokesman, Rasiah Ilanthiraiyan, assured journalists that 'More attacks of the same nature will follow', the rebels will struggle to carry out regular strikes similar to the one near Colombo on 26 March. The military is likely to respond to the threat by carrying out bombing raids on suspected air strips in the north and by acquiring a modern air defence system. The rebels' first air strike caused minimal damage to the Sri Lankan air force base and did not exact a great number of casualties. The military has already forced the rebels from most of their strongholds in the east and is now preparing to launch a major offensive in the north.

The days following the air strike were followed by more conventional Sri Lankan warfare. On 27 March, an LTTE suicide bomber killed eight people in an attack on an army camp in the coastal district of Batticaloa. One day later, Sri Lankan troops drove the rebels from their Kokkadicholai base near Batticaloa. This was followed by a sea battle off the coast of Trincomalee on 29 March in which the Sri Lankan navy managed to sink three rebel boats. More of the same will follow and the Tigers' air capability will not likely change the intensity or the geography of the conflict in the short- to medium-term. The air strike will, however, boost the morale of the Tigers, who have been battered of late and are due to face an onslaught by the military in the north. red24 currently advises against all non-essential travel to Sri Lanka and against all travel to the Eastern Province and all areas north of the A12 highway.

Kidnapping highlights risks in remote Afar region

red24 — Wed, 14 Mar 2007 15:43:00 GMT

On 1 March 2007, a group of five Europeans (three British men, a British-Italian woman and a French woman) from the British embassy in Addis Ababa, and a dozen Ethiopian guides and helpers, were abducted near the village of Hamedali in the Afar region of Ethiopia. The party was reportedly on a sightseeing tour when they were snatched at gunpoint by around 50 masked men. The hostages were forced to abandon their vehicles, which were later found riddled with bullet holes and grenade shrapnel, and march northwards across the border into Eritrea. The Europeans were held captive for 13 days until they were released yesterday into the care of authorities in Asmara, the Eritrean capital. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett stated that they are in good health and would shortly be flown home to reunite with their families. She also expressed concern for the safety of the eight Ethiopians abducted along with the embassy staff, who remain in the hands of the kidnappers. Although kidnapping is rare in Ethiopia, the incident does illustrate the risks involved in travelling to the northern Afar region and demonstrates the need for individuals to adopt comprehensive security measures when travelling in such remote areas.

The Afar region is one of the most inhospitable places on earth. It is a vast, unforgiving, lunar-like desert. Straddling the disputed Ethiopia-Eritrea border, it is a heavily militarised area and a potential flashpoint between two countries who have endured a strained relationship since Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a costly 30-year guerrilla war. Separatist rebels and bandit gangs also patrol the area, with their activities deemed dangerous enough to warrant the Ethiopian authorities to insist on armed guards for all overseas visitors to the area. However, as the 1 March incident demonstrates, the protection offered by these guards in no way guarantees safe passage. Nevertheless, despite the ostensibly uninviting nature of the region, it does attract intrepid tourists who are lured by the remote desert landscapes, the volcanoes and geysers, the rich salt lakes and the local tribal people.

It is these local people who are suspected of kidnapping the Europeans and their guides. The Afar tribe, a largely nomadic, Muslim people, carry a reputation almost as tough and as hostile as their environment. Economically, they are heavily reliant on mining salt from the vast lakes of the Danakil Depression. Recently, however, their livelihood has been challenged by the imposition of a salt tax by the Ethiopian authorities. This had led to widespread resentment among Afar tribesmen and a suspicion that outsiders are seeking to exploit the salt wealth of their homeland. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the group responsible for the abduction of the Europeans and their party had first targeted local Ethiopian tax collectors, stealing their money and burning one of their cars. Only then did they turn their attention to the foreign visitors. Regardless of the accuracy of these uncorroborated reports, visitors to northern Afar should be aware that anger towards the Ethiopian authorities over salt tax is palpable and that it could lead to violence. In addition, outsiders are generally viewed with suspicion and as a potential threat to the Afars' salt-mining monopoly.

Visitors to northern Afar should also be aware of the region's large-scale bandit problem. The region's poverty (the average income of an Afar tribesmen is less than US$100 a year; most Afars are illiterate; and many struggle for access to clean water and medical supplies) means that many Afars have turned to crime as a means of survival. The problem is compounded by the region's remoteness and the accompanying lack of governmental authority. As a result, predatory bandit groups roam the area's many isolated roads and prey on the unsuspecting or unprepared.

A further threat to visitors emanates from a rebel movement, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic United Front (ARDUF, also known as 'Uguguma', meaning 'Revolution' in the Afar language). Founded in 1993, it brought together three existing Afar organisations and seeks to establish the creation of an independent Afar territory that would span areas of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The organisation has abducted foreigners in the past; in 1995, the group seized a group of Italian tourists and held them for a week before releasing them unharmed. In July 2003, ARDUF joined the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces, an umbrella movement made up of various opposition parties and groups. Soon after, in September 2003, ARDUF issued a warning to foreigners not to enter the Afar region to demarcate the disputed Ethiopia-Eritrea border - ARDUF opposes the existence of any boundary that divides the Afar people and, as a consequence, it also opposes the existence of Eritrea, which currently splits the 'Afar homeland'. Although ARDUF's military capabilities have been weakened in recent years by internal disagreements, the organisation continues to wage a low-level insurgency. Given that the organisation is no closer to achieving its goals, and considering the publicity generated by the kidnapping of the Europeans as well as the fact that it has been responsible for a previous abduction, there is the possibility that ARDUF may embark on a kidnapping campaign in order to publicise its cause.

In light of these threats, red24 advises that travel into the Afar region, and particularly travel close to the Eritrean border, should be undertaken only with extreme caution and not without prior consultation. Although kidnapping remains a rare occurrence, bandits and rebels pose a serious threat to personal safety and the publicity generated by the kidnapping of the Europeans may encourage further attempts. In addition, the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains tense, with both sides continuing to support a heavy military presence in the region. Considering that eight Ethiopian nationals remain captive in Eritrea, military escalation cannot be ruled out and northern Afar may soon play host to a bloody and destabilising confrontation.

The northern insurgency reignites

red24 — Thu, 8 Mar 2007 14:37:00 GMT

Clashes between government troops and Shiite rebels in Yemen's northern province of Saada continue to rage. Although precise figures are hard to obtain due to a military-enforced media blackout in the region, unconfirmed reports suggest that over 400 Yemeni troops and 150-plus Shiite guerrillas have been killed since January. There are, as of yet, no accurate reports on the total number of civilian casualties. The fighting in the region, some 200km north of the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, has the potential to spread and escalate, further destabilising an already fragile state.

The province of Saada has long been ravaged by rebellion and this latest uprising, dubbed 'Al-Houthi's sedition' by Yemenis, is by no means a new movement. Well-armed Shiite rebels have repeatedly been involved in bloody confrontations with government forces since Shiite cleric Hussein al-Houthi and his group, Al Shabab al-Moumin or the Believing Youth, declared war against the Yemeni state in 2004 over what they perceived to be the promotion of Sunni Salafi ideology at the expense of their Zaidi Shiite sect in Saada province, historically the fortress of Zaydism in Yemen. Al-Houthi also viewed the Yemeni government as corrupt and traitorous for its cooperation with Israel and the United States, particularly in the global war on terror.

Although Hussein al-Houthi was killed by government forces early in the insurgency, a sporadic conflict in Saada has raged now for three years, costing the Yemeni state an estimated US$800m and claiming the lives of several hundred troops, rebels and civilians. Many more have been injured or driven from their homes. It was thought that Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh's initiative to release 600 al-Houthi supporters in an amnesty in May 2006 would go some way to ending the violence, but, although a tentative truce held until early this year, violence has now reignited in the Saada region. On 27 January, Shiite rebels, now known as the Mujahedeen Group and led by Hussein al-Houthi's brother, Abdul Malik, launched a mortar attack on a security building in the Saada region, killing six soldiers. This attack followed an incident on 10 January when 45 Jewish families in the town of al-Haid, in Saada, received threatening letters from Shiite rebels that drove them from their homes. Al-Houthi and his movement have stated that their attacks are a response to the government's failure to honour agreements regarding military activity and territorial control in Saada. However, the government has denied that any such agreements had been made and responded to the attacks by launching a full-scale military assault against the rebels in early February 2007.

The result has been yet another bloody confrontation. Pitched battles in the region's mountainous areas have raged for weeks, hit-and-run guerrilla attacks are increasingly common and army losses are suspected to be high. However, this violence has the potential to escalate even further. In the military's determination to crush the uprising, it has been accused of using excessive force. Homes, schools and farms have already been destroyed and civilian casualties are alleged to be high. Considering Yemen's tribal structure, which has a strong emphasis on honour and revenge, the Shiite rebels are likely to receive more support, which will only increase the longevity and intensity of their campaign.

In addition, although the violence is currently contained in the Saada province and particularly in and around the al-Talh and Saqeen Mountains and the al-Habayel area of the region, it does have the potential to spread further afield. Abdul Malik al-Houthi has threatened to expand his group's sphere of operations, noting that his forces had already opened up a new front in the Khulan Amer area of Saada with relative ease. The authorities in Yemen appear to believe that al-Houthi's threat is credible. Security in the streets of Sana'a has increased noticeably over the past few weeks. Police and military units have installed roadblocks and have been conducting searches and identity verifications. Although General Mohammed al-Qawsi, deputy minister of the interior, said that the security campaign was unrelated to the problems in Saada, a source within the Yemeni police force admitted that the security surge was a response to the increased Shiite rebel threat. The security forces have also been on alert in the Dhamar and Marib provinces, hinting that the al-Houthi movement has either the capability or the ambition to strike in those areas as well.

Unfortunately, the likelihood of a swift and peaceful solution to the current crisis appears low. In an effort to isolate the rebels, the military has imposed a communications blackout across the Saada region, making negotiation all but impossible. Even if this communication blockade was lifted, the two sides' positions appear entrenched. The government views al-Houthi and his supporters as a significant threat to its authority and it is very eager to bring an end to a movement that has perpetuated three costly years of conflict and instability. Meanwhile, the rebels, as demonstrated through their dogged refusal to join the political process and through their consistent attacks, appear to be ideological hardliners unwilling to pursue their goals through peaceful means. Such polarisation suggests that a prolonged conflict is likely, especially since a decisive strike on the al-Houthi leadership currently appears remote.

As it is, President Saleh, and Yemen itself, cannot afford a robust insurgency in one of its northern provinces. Firstly, the complex sectarian and tribal nature of the Shiite rebellion has the potential to upset the delicate power base of the ruling party, the General People's Congress. Various personalities, both in government and the opposition, may well use the opportunity to advance their own conflicting interests if the government is perceived as weak, and this could further destabilise Yemen. Secondly, a long-running insurgency and an accompanying military campaign will certainly damage investor confidence, something that Yemen, as the poorest country in the Arab world, can ill afford.

Although the al-Houthi Zaidi Shiite rebellion is currently confined to Yemen's northern territory, it is a bloody and costly insurgency that has the potential not only to spread but also to escalate in intensity, triggering further political and economic instability in Yemen. Unless a political or military solution can be found to the violence in Saada, Yemen faces a bleak future.

Guinea - Standing on the precipice?

red24 — Thu, 22 Feb 2007 13:37:00 GMT

On 12 February 2007, Guinean President Lansana Conte declared a 'state of siege' and established martial law and a curfew throughout Guinea. Government forces, including members of the presidential guard, gendarmes and the police, were deployed throughout the country, with major towns, such as Kankan, Nzerekore, Labe and the capital, Conakry, being placed under heavy military control. The government move occurred soon after union protesters, who have demanded that the president stand down, announced their intention to resume nationwide and open-ended strikes aimed at bringing down Conte's regime. Although the curfew was eased on 18 February, suggesting that the government believes that the threat of violence and protests has now subsided, the unions have yet to reach an agreement with Conte's administration and the situation in Guinea remains volatile. In fact, the country's social and political tensions are such that Guinea now stands on the precipice of civil strife and chaos.

The crisis now engulfing Guinea was sparked just before Christmas 2006, when President Conte, who came to power in a military coup back in 1984, personally went to Conakry's central prison and freed two close associates. The two individuals, Guinea's wealthiest businessman and a former top official of the central bank, were being held on serious fraud and corruption charges. The unconstitutional nature of their release, coupled with the state's decline and the continued impoverishment of the population, outraged Guinea's two main trade unions, the National Confederation of Guinean workers and the Guinean Workers' Union. On 10 January, they launched a nationwide and open-ended strike in an effort to oust Conte. Towns throughout Guinea rallied to support the action. Banks, schools and markets closed and tens of thousands took to the streets to protest against the regime's 23-year rule. Mobs ransacked police stations and government offices and some criminal elements in the country took advantage of the breakdown in law and order to rob shops and passers-by.

On 26 January, Conte promised to appoint a neutral prime minister who would have substantial and far-reaching powers. It was hoped that this gesture would placate his opponents, end the strike and stop the protests. However, in nominating Eugene Camara, a close political ally, on 9 February, Conte simply provoked more protests and rioting. Three days into this violence, Conte declared martial law and moved to repress the protests against his regime. On the face of it, the move appears to have worked. The violence has subsided and the government has been able to reduce the hours of the curfew. However, the situation remains tense. The stalemate continues between an apparently entrenched Conte and the unions, who have declared that the strike will not end until martial law is lifted. The longer this situation continues, the greater the likelihood of violence.

In naming Camara as prime minister and in deciding on utilising military force to restore order, the Conte regime has demonstrated that it has no intention of acquiescing to any demands and that it will fight to ensure its survival. However, it is facing a population hugely dissatisfied with the status quo. Many are angry that their country is in a dire economic state, despite large reserves of gold, diamonds, iron ore and bauxite. A recent United Nations (UN) report concluded that over ten percent of the Guinean population struggle to eat one meal a day. Salaries in Guinea are desperately low, while the price of basic goods, such as rice and petrol, continues to rise. Anger and frustration with these problems will have only increased in light of the state's violent response to the protests. Considering the level of this political tension, it looks unlikely that a compromise will be found and, if that is the case, further violent confrontations appear inevitable.

The failing health of the president is also contributing to a volatile situation. Conte is now thought to be 73 and is suffering from diabetes. It is unlikely that he will live for much longer. However, he has not named a successor and his inner circle, like Guinean society itself, is hugely divided along ethnic lines. The three-way ethno-political split between the dominant Soussou minority and the Malinke and Peul ethnic groupings has the potential to be exploited by powerful, self-interested political players and there is a real fear that the current instability or Conte's death will provoke a civil war along sectarian lines.

In addition, although Conte is a military man with close ties to the military leadership and although the regime recently increased soldiers' pay in order to buy their loyalty, a military coup attempt can also not be ruled out at this time. Senior military officers, particularly those close to Conte, are currently facing the prospect of an uncertain future and they may be compelled to act to ensure their survival. Guinea's security and defence forces are also beset with ethnic and generational divisions. The official chain of command is fragile and signs of fragmentation were seen last week when gunfire was heard inside one of Conakry's main barracks. If Guinea's current political crisis drags on, the likelihood of a coup or of some form of military mutiny increases. This would obviously have disastrous consequences, probably leading to the same sort of civil strife that engulfed Guinea's neighbours in recent years.

Guinea is no stranger to political crises or instability. President Conte has himself survived several assassination attempts and coup plots over the years and the country has witnessed first-hand the devastating implosion of neighbouring Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. However, Guinea currently stands on the edge of a precipice, and similar turmoil is not that far way. Although the curfew has been eased, banks, government offices and major shops remain closed and the political deadlock continues. Without political change and improvements in Guinea's economic situation, violent confrontations are highly likely. If these do occur, they have the potential to tear the country apart.

Crime in South Africa – An Unassailable Problem?

red24 — Sun, 11 Feb 2007 21:54:00 GMT

On 9 February 2007, South African President Thabo Mbeki acknowledged in his eighth annual State of the Nation speech that his government needed to work harder to combat the ‘ugly and repulsive’ scourge of violent crime. Mbeki, under pressure after recently saying that he did not think crime was a major problem, promised to increase police numbers, improve intelligence and forensic data, and reduce court backlogs. Mbeki’s recognition that violent crime was a problem came as a surprise to many critics who had accused him of not doing enough to cut crime and of being apathetic to the country’s security issues. Many in South Africa now hope that the government will bring the country’s rampant criminality under control. However, considering South Africa’s socio-economic imbalances and tensions, it is unlikely that Mbeki’s investment in the criminal justice system alone will be enough to bring about a significant reduction in the country’s crime rates.

Political and social transformation have profoundly affected South Africa. New and non-racial forms of democratic government have been established and entrenched at national, provincial and local levels. The disintegrating economy of the apartheid era has been transformed into one of low budget deficits, low inflation, and year on year growth for the past eight years. However, the journey has been far from painless: while political violence has ended, violent criminality has increased. In 2006 alone, official figures show that there were some 18,500 murders, over 20,000 attempted murders, 55,000 reported rapes and 120,000 violent robberies. Despite these shocking statistics, the South African government has been slow to accept that there is a problem. As recently as last month, President Mbeki dismissed the issue of crime as ‘exaggerated’ and just a few days later, national police commissioner Jackie Selebi, asked ‘what’s all the fuss about crime?’. The comments caused public outrage. Mbeki’s political opponents labelled him a denialist and tens of thousands of South Africans signed internet petitions urging the president to tackle crime seriously.

Mbeki’s State of the Nation address suggests that that message has now got through. In addition to conceding that there is a problem, Mbeki’s speech also outlined some broad policy promises. He stated that his government would boost pay and increase the number of police officers from 152,000 to 180,000 over the next three years. He also vowed to improve the force's intelligence gathering and analysis capability and the efficiency of the country’s courts and forensic laboratories, and to enhance the country’s border controls and build new prisons. It is a step in the right direction but it is not likely to bring about a wholesale improvement in the country’s crime rates.

Firstly, South Africa’s crime problem is largely a result of poverty and inequality. Although the country has had an outstandingly successful decade economically, little of this growth has benefited the poorest sections of South African society. Despite a five percent growth in GDP over the past year and significant government investment in housing and infrastructure for the poor, the number of people in poverty in South Africa is increasing, as is the gap between rich and poor. The country’s official unemployment rate stands at about 26 percent and unofficial estimates place it as high as 40 percent. In addition, according to UNAID, although the country is regarded as Africa’s economic powerhouse, over 34 percent of its 48 million inhabitants live on US$2 or less a day. Crime is seen as a means of survival for many in South Africa and a mechanism of retribution for others. While many claim that poverty and inequality are the primary drivers of criminality in SA, there is currently further discussion as to why crime is so frequently accompanied by high levels of violence. Some suggest that this violence stems from deeper social problems that are particular to South Africa and its past. Unless the country’s socio-economic imbalances are addressed, South Africa’s crime problem will continue and is even likely to worsen.

Secondly, South Africa already spends a lot on its criminal justice system. The annual budget for the police, courts and prisons in South Africa rose from US$2.3 billion in 2001 to US$4.2 billion in 2006. This spending represents over two percent of its GDP, compared to an average of one percent in the rest of the world. Yet this high level of spending has not had much effect on the lower levels of crime. One problem is with the management and leadership of the police. The South African Police Service (SAPS) suffers from the legacy of apartheid. Its transition from an instrument of political repression into a crime-fighting force has been long and arduous. Many experienced (and mainly white) officers have left. The force remains on the whole poorly trained and ill-disciplined. Police corruption is widespread and there is evidence of collusion with criminal elements. Improved pay, conditions and training would help, but there also needs to be a change of ethos and direction. However, there is little leadership at the top. Unless Mbeki and his administration instigate a top-down transformation of the SAPS, it is unlikely that his bottom-up investment in the country’s criminal justice system will have even a nominal effect on crime.

South Africa’s government, like those in both the developed and developing world, appears to be relying too heavily on the criminal justice system to solve crime problems and is failing to adequately tackle the socio-economic issues that are at the heart of the problem. Although increasing police numbers and building more jails may initially satisfy both the media and the public, without addressing the country’s problems of poverty, inequality, juvenile delinquency and lingering racism, they are highly unlikely to bring about a significant improvement in South Africa’s security environment.

Kosovo - a potential flashpoint

red24 — Wed, 7 Feb 2007 13:18:00 GMT

On 2 February 2007, the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy to Kosovo, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, presented his plan for the future of the troubled Serb province. Ahtisaari’s proposal allows Kosovo supervised separation from Serbia and the territory would be allowed its own national symbols, including an anthem and a flag, and could apply for membership of international organisations like the UN. However, in an effort to appease Serbia, the proposal made no explicit mention of independence, although many believe that Ahtisaari’s plan is an irrevocable step in that direction.

Although technically a province within Serbia, Kosovo has been in UN-administered limbo for eight years since a NATO bombing campaign forced Serbian forces to withdraw in 1999. It is one of the poorest regions in Europe, with a per capita income of about US$1,600 per year and an estimated unemployment rate of about 40 percent. It is a region beset with clan rivalries and ethnic tensions and has a reputation for corruption and organised crime. Of its some two million people, about 90 percent are ethnic Albanians, the overwhelming majority of which want independence from Serbia. The remaining 200,000 or so are largely orthodox Christian Serbs and they, like their compatriots in Serbia, insist on keeping the province within Serbia’s borders. Talks between the two sides have been ongoing for years, but an agreement has never been forthcoming. Ahtisaari’s compromise plan is an effort to end the deadlock, although some are concerned that it will simply spark renewed violence.

The plan has already caused significant consternation in the region. Serbian President Boris Tadic immediately refused to accept it, stating that Serbia would never agree to an independent Kosovo. Serbs in Kosovo expressed dismay and anger and the head of Kosovo’s moderate Serbian List Party, Oliver Ivanovic, threatened full-scale war in the province if it attempted independence. Meanwhile, mainstream politicians from Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority appeared to approve of Ahtisaari’s recommendations. Radical Kosovo Albanian groups, however, promised protests, claiming that the plan did not go far enough or quickly enough. With tensions running high and given the horrors that blighted Yugoslavia’s break-up in the 1990s, there are concerns that Ahtisaari’s Kosovo roadmap could trigger a further bout of ethno-centric violence and bloodshed. However, red24 believes that such an outcome is unlikely. Although the situation is unstable and unpredictable, only isolated acts of violence can be expected in the short- to medium-term.

One fear is that Ahtisaari’s plan will not satisfy many Kosovo Albanians, who have grown weary of waiting for full and official independence from Serbia. There are worries that ethnic Albanians will take out these frustrations on local Serbs in the region. They point to March 2004 as an indicator of the possible unrest that might now follow when independence-demanding mobs attacked Serbs, their property and their historic religious monuments throughout the province. Nineteen people died, many more were injured, and thousands were driven from their homes and communities. The situation today, however, is quite different. In 2004, the violence was not a spontaneous reaction caused by widespread frustration, but an organised rebellion arranged and sanctioned by people close to Kosovo’s leading political parties as a demonstration to the international community of their clout and of the ramifications if they did not get what they wanted. Today, there is widespread belief among Kosovo Albanians that they are getting independence, albeit not as quickly as some of them might have hoped. Many political parties in the Kosovo capital, Pristina, also realise that violence will only jeopardise this path to self-determination and that they therefore ought to try to keep a lid on any unrest. Furthermore, the 17,000-strong NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR) currently in the province is well equipped to deal with any violence.

Other commentators are concerned with the Serbian reaction to the proposal. Kosovo holds an almost mythical status for many Serbs - it is seen as an ancestral homeland and many view Kosovo independence as an anathema. With the ultra-nationalist Radical Party winning the largest share of the vote in the Serbian elections held on 21 January 2007, people have speculated that Serbia might attempt to retake the province. However, this is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although the Radical Party won the highest percentage of the vote, it will not be in power, as it collected fewer votes than the combined total of two other parties, the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, which together are likely to form a governing coalition. Both of these parties have explicitly ruled out using military means to keep Kosovo inside of Serbia and both are pro-European Union.

The greatest risk of violence emanates from extremists on both sides of the ethnic divide in Kosovo itself. Despite Ahtisaari’s proposal to safeguard the interests of Kosovo’s Serbs, including the Serbian Orthodox Church and language, leading Kosovo Serbs denounced the plan and radicals threatened violence and outright war should the province move toward independence. Although Serbs in Kosovo do not make up nearly a high enough percentage of the population to attempt any meaningful military or paramilitary action, any organised protests could escalate and isolated incidents of violence could occur, particularly in the medium and large Serb enclaves in the central and eastern parts of the territory. In addition, radical groups within the ethnic Albanian majority have also expressed bitter dissatisfaction with the plan. Some are angry that it does not grant immediate independence, while others are worried about the degree of autonomy granted to Serbs within the province. Protests have been planned and sporadic violence may occur as many people in the territory are poorly informed about the process and have unrealistic expectations.

The UN proposal on Kosovo’s final status was always likely to cause some upheaval and instability. Ahtisaari’s compromise package is unlikely to be the catalyst for the mass ethno-centric violence the region has previously witnessed. However, the situation remains unstable and unpredictable, and red24 advises against all travel to the region at this time.

The persisting anarchist and far-left terror threat

red24 — Wed, 31 Jan 2007 14:03:00 GMT

On 12 January 2007, a small anti-tank rocket was fired at the US embassy compound in the centre of the Greek capital, Athens. Narrowly missing the embassy emblem, the rocket pierced the building and exploded inside. Although it caused only minor damage and no casualties, the attack had the potential to inflict significant loss of life. The far-left extremist group Epanastatikos Aghonas (Revolutionary Struggle - EA) claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it was a ‘response to the criminal war on terrorism that the US has launched across the planet’. The group also went on to threaten further attacks in the future. The embassy attack is symptomatic of a recent resurgence in anarchist and far-left militant activity in Greece.

The Mediterranean country has suffered from a rash of bomb and arson attacks throughout the month of January, with both anarchist and far-left groups targeting government offices and banks both in Athens and Greece’s second-largest city, Thessaloniki. Although these attacks also caused no loss of life or serious injury, they have caused significant damage and disruption and have led to heightened anxiety throughout Greece. They have also highlighted the continuing threat that anarchist and extreme left-wing groups pose to the Greek security environment.

Greece has long been plagued by radical anarchist and left-wing organisations that have used violence to further their cause. Historically, the two most prominent/prolific organisations have been Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri (Revolutionary Organisation November 17) and Epanastikos Laikos Agnoas (Revolutionary Popular Struggle). Their ideological basis could be summarised as revolutionary, anti-capitalist, anti-US, anti-West and anti-NATO. Between them, these two groups have been responsible for over 25 deaths in the past 30 years, including the 1975 assassination of the CIA station chief in Athens. They have also assassinated Greek, Turkish and UK officials, launched rocket attacks against military installations and repeatedly bombed foreign – particularly American – interests. However, in July 2002, amid mounting international pressure to track down and neutralise terrorists before the 2004 Olympic Games, the Greek security services achieved several breakthroughs in relation to these two organisations. After fortuitously arresting and then interrogating a November 17 suspect after a bomb prematurely exploded in his hands, they were able to detain several key personalities in the anarchist and extreme far-left movements. Those arrested were successfully prosecuted, with 15 of the accused receiving lengthy prison sentences. It was thought, primarily because of the relative peace that followed, that the groups had been dealt a fatal blow.

However, the attacks on the US embassy, Greek government buildings and banks throughout January suggest that these groups have either recovered, re-establishing their capabilities and adopting new monikers, or that new, unknown groups have filled the vacuum left by November 17 and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle . However, regardless of whether these recent attacks are the work of old or new groups, it is highly likely that the attacks will continue. For starters, Greece’s political and social climate, brimming as it is with potent anti-Americanism, provides a sustainable environment for anarchist and far-left groups to flourish. Secondly, these groups will be emboldened by their previous successes and encouraged by the kudos granted to their underground revolutionary status. Greek government efforts to clamp down on these organisations will be hampered by the groups’ small-scale and insular nature. These groups are traditionally numerically small and tight-knit. Seemingly impervious to infiltration they have demonstrated an ability to carry out successful and high-profile attacks while avoiding detection or apprehension. The fact that security sources remain in the dark as to the actual sizes, leadership structures and evolution of the various groups is testament to this resilience and robustness.

As further attacks are likely, visitors to Greece are urged to exercise vigilance and caution at all times, particularly in the vicinity of Greek government buildings, banks or US interests. Although recent attacks have occurred typically late at night or early in the morning, clients should be aware that this may change and that although recent attacks have not been fatal, this should be attributed more to luck than to inept or inadequate planning, since the locations chosen and weapons used have been nothing short of ideal.