Facing a multi-faceted and long-term jihadist threat
UNITED KINGDOM | Thursday, 5 July 2007 | Views [360]
As the 7/7 anniversary approaches, the UK finds itself once again on a high state of alert for terrorism. At 15:15 on 30 June 2007, two men attempted to drive a gas and petrol-laden Jeep Cherokee 4x4 into the main entrance of Terminal 1 at Glasgow International Airport. Although bollards and other obstructions appear to have prevented the vehicle fully penetrating the building itself, it did burst into flames, injuring five people and significantly damaging the terminal’s façade. The attack on Glasgow airport came just 36 hours after police discovered two car bombs in central London. The UK police and intelligence service response to the attempted attacks has been extensive and swift. Nineteen properties have been raided, including addresses in Liverpool, in the village of Houston, Renfrewshire, and in the town of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire. Eight individuals have been detained. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), based at MI5’s Thames House headquarters, raised the UK’s official threat level status from ‘severe’ to ‘critical’. The critical threat level is the highest level on a five-point scale, and indicates that an attack is expected imminently.
Although shocking, the attack on Glasgow airport and the attempted London bombings should surprise no-one. The terror threat to the UK is well-established. The country has long been viewed by al-Qaeda, other militant Islamist groups and young, radicalised, British-born Muslims as a prime target, given its close involvement in the US-led ‘war on terror’. Likewise, the timing of the attempted attacks could also be regarded as predictable. Britain’s recent political power transition was always likely to act as a potential trigger for an attack. Jihadists have, as they demonstrated in 2004 with the Madrid train bombings, attacked countries during periods of political transition in a bid to influence foreign policy. As recently as April 2007, JTAC released a report suggesting that Tony Blair’s departure from office, an event described by al-Qaeda planners as ‘a change at the head of the company’, could invite a terrorist attack.
The Glasgow airport and London terror attempts appear to be the work of foreign jihadists. Of the eight individuals currently detained by police in connection with the attacks, only one appears to have been born in the UK. The rest are reportedly from overseas, and include an Iraqi, a Saudi, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, two Indians and a Lebanese national. Although it is simply speculation at this stage, it is possible that the bombers received some training and instruction from al-Qaeda. Multiple car bombings and suicide attacks are a well-established al-Qaeda tactic, and although both attacks failed, suggesting tactical and technical naivety, the bombers may well have been constrained by the components available to them. Powerful military-grade explosives and munitions used in car bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan are extremely difficult to acquire in the UK, and supplies of peroxide and fertilizer, used in previous UK bomb plots and attacks, are perceived to be more closely watched and regulated than in the past. As a result, those responsible for the Glasgow and London attempts may have been forced to use cruder explosive devices made from gas cylinders, petrol and nails. Such devices have been used before, most notably by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1995 when it attacked the Paris metro, killing eight and wounding 80. However, these devices are also notoriously unreliable. As recently as last summer suspected Lebanese terrorists attempted to set off two propane-based bombs on trains heading for Cologne, Germany, but the detonator failed to ignite the gas. It would appear, thankfully, that a similar failure befell the London car bombers.
The latest attacks also reinforce the fact that the jihadist threat to the UK comes not only from marginalised and impoverished young men but also from highly-educated and middle-class sections of Muslim society. Seven of the eight people so far detained in connection with the attempted attacks are thought to be doctors or medical students, and all have worked for the British National Health Service (NHS). Although the medical revelation is shocking, it is by no means an unheard of phenomenon. Several leading jihadists have medical backgrounds; Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two, is a qualified surgeon, and Mahmoud al-Zahar, co-founder of Hamas, is also a doctor. However, the fact that some jihadists operating in the UK have a medical background does have frightening implications for the UK security environment. As medical professionals these individuals would have had access to, and knowledge of, chemicals, infectious spores and cultures, and radioactive materials. Such substances could be used to create extremely lethal or panic-inducing weapons, and the British police and intelligence services will be anxious to find out whether any of this expertise or material was passed on to other terror cells or organisations.
The British government’s response to the Glasgow airport and London incidents will be carefully calibrated. It will certainly avoid knee-jerk crackdowns or the imposition of draconian measures on local Muslim communities. Such actions would only serve to exacerbate perceptions that the West is engaged in war against Islam and Muslims, and would only encourage further attacks. Instead, the UK government appears likely to place more emphasis on the development of softer security strategies to compliment the traditional ‘hard’ security response. Newly installed prime minister Gordon Brown has already talked of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in the battle against jihadism, and government rhetoric suggests that it is going to encourage and support an intellectual battle against Islamic extremism, challenging radical Imams and their interpretations of the Koran. The government is also likely to tighten entry and practising requirements for foreign Imams, in an attempt to prevent additional extremist preachers from entering the country. Such measures should go some way to eliminate the radicalising environment that produces jihadists in the first place. However, improvements in hard security measures are also likely to be looked at. Border controls need to be improved, and a system that highlights the travel patterns of UK citizens requires development. The government also needs to amend the law on phone-tap evidence; allowing such evidence in trials will increase the conviction rate and reduce the likelihood of terror suspects being placed on inadequate supervision control orders.
However, the UK government faces an enormous task. The country is confronting a long-term and severe terrorist threat which emanates both from al-Qaeda-funded, trained, and directed groups and from local, self-generating, autonomous terror cells. All of these groups are adaptable, innovative, highly motivated and willing to die for their cause. The organisation, training and capabilities of the terrorists are also likely to improve over time. The sheer weight of the threat – Eliza Manningham-Buller, the outgoing head of MI5, said in November 2006 that the service was tracking more than 1,600 known active militants and some 30 terror plots – suggests that the British government’s response will need to be every bit as dedicated, international and multifaceted as the threat that stems from the jihadists themselves. In the immediate future, the terrorist threat remains extremely high. Although the cell responsible for the attempted attacks on 29 and 30 June appears to have been rounded-up, and despite JTAC now reportedly considering a reduction in the national threat level, further attacks cannot be ruled out. Any new security measures will be difficult to implement rapidly, and copycat attacks, perpetrated by individuals or groups unrelated to the cell currently being held, are a possibility.
Tags: travel safety, red24, uk
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