The rise of the anti-Putin movement
RUSSIAN FEDERATION | Friday, 13 April 2007 | Views [686]
On 14 April 2007, various Russian opposition groups will hold a large rally in central Moscow to protest against President Vladimir Putin and his government. Another so-called ‘Dissenters March’ will take place a day later in St Petersburg. These two rallies are the latest in a series of anti-Putin demonstrations. On 3 March 2007, over 5,000 anti-Putin protesters marched through Nevsky Prospekt, St Petersburg’s central boulevard, and on 24 March, demonstrators defied a ban and marched in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia’s fourth largest city, to protest against his administration. The rallies have been organised by ‘The Other Russia’, a diverse coalition of opposition groups hostile to the Kremlin and alarmed by what they see as Vladimir Putin’s increasing authoritarianism. The coalition includes the United Civil Front movement led by chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov, the Popular Democratic Union party headed by former Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, and the National Bolshevik party. The strength and number of protests in recent months illustrate the growing domestic unease with Vladimir Putin’s leadership and suggests that the run-up to parliamentary elections in December 2007 and to presidential elections in March 2008 will not be incident-free.
At first glance, it is difficult to understand why Putin is the subject of internal hostility. Since coming to power in 2000, Putin has turned Russia around. He inherited a country from Boris Yeltsin that was wracked by political and economic chaos and has managed to bring about stability and development. His strict macroeconomic management, combined with the high price of oil, has delivered seven successive years of strong economic growth for the country. He has managed to pay off Russia’s US$22 billion foreign debt and most foreign exchange controls have been abolished. Wages and living standards are rising throughout the country and a middle class has begun to emerge, even in the provinces. However, the political liberalisation that is often thought to accompany economic success has not materialised.
In fact, Russia has witnessed a gradual erosion of political and civil freedom during Putin’s tenure. His seven years in office have been characterised by efforts to centralise and consolidate power. Putin has attempted to sideline, co-opt and crush all serious opposition to his administration. For example, potential political rival Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly the super-rich controller of Russian petroleum company YUKOS, is currently serving time in a Siberian prison on allegedly trumped-up tax evasion and fraud charges, while another potential threat to Putin, billionaire Boris Berezovsky, fled to London after fearing for his life in Russia. The Kremlin has also attempted to neuter opposition parties. Recent Kremlin-initiated legislation stipulates that Russian political parties, if they are to be recognised, need to have a minimum of 50,000 members and need to be represented in half of the country’s provinces. In March 2007, Russia’s Supreme Court invoked these regulations and closed down the Republican Party, the Russian Peace Party and the Nationalist Bolshevik Party, all players within ‘The Other Russia’ coalition. Sources within the Russia election registration office also state that the Supreme Court is likely to outlaw five other political parties within the next few months. The Kremlin states that these regulations are designed simply to streamline the country’s untidy political scene. However, critics argue that it is a mechanism to stifle the opposition. Putin has also moved against the media. Apart from a few Moscow-based newspapers, the relatively free media of the 1990s has been replaced by supine institutions that are controlled by the state or by Kremlin-friendly businesses. Reporting of opposition parties is largely non-existent and the multitude of coverage of Putin and his ministers is almost entirely uncritical.
Democracy in Russia has now been rolled back to the extent that the country today has very much the look and feel of a new Soviet Union. The socialist ideology may have changed, but the old Soviet centralisation of power remains. In such a climate, it is unsurprising that people are taking to the streets. However, such popular protests have not gone unnoticed by Putin and his administration. On 4 April, Moscow’s pro-Kremlin city council passed legislation restricting the number of people allowed to take part in political rallies to two per square metre. Demonstrators are also banned from gathering in front of historic monuments and from holding indoor meetings if there are more people than chairs. The legislation is likely to be adopted by other pro-Kremlin city councils and effectively renders street protests and large internal rallies illegal. Although ‘The Other Russia’ coalition has already stated its intent to defy the ban, future protests are likely to provoke a draconian response from the state’s security apparatus.
Although Putin has moved to suppress opposition activity in Russia and will step up such activity as he looks to consolidate enough political and economic power to hand over the country confidently (his second presidential term ends in March 2008), it is likely that his actions will only encourage further large-scale protests against him. By choking the opposition and controlling the media, Putin drives disenfranchised elements of Russian society to the streets, the only remaining avenue Russians have to express political dissatisfaction. Moves now to disrupt or prevent such demonstrations will simply serve to further antagonise the anti-Putin movement and may push protesters to employ more extreme tactics. However, although opposition protests will continue to occur and may intensify over the next 10-12 months, they do not have the potential to threaten Putin or the stability of the Russian Federation. Despite his increasing authoritarianism, Putin maintains a high level of public support in Russia, consistently achieving approval ratings of 75-80 percent, and can call on a formidable state security apparatus to contain or crush any internal dissent. 2007 should witness several large-scale protests against Putin’s government and several are likely to turn violent. However, these demonstrations are unlikely to bring about any change in Russia’s civil structure or democratic process.
Tags: travel safety, russia, putin, kremlin, moscow
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