The security implications of Thailand’s coup
THAILAND | Wednesday, 27 September 2006 | Views [939] | Comments [3]
After more than a half century of military coups and other interventions, Thailand has once again suffered a sudden and undemocratic change of government. At midnight on 19 September 2006, Royal Thai Army Chief Lt Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin successfully led a military coup, deposing caretaker prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was in New York at the United Nations (UN) meeting at the time. The coup was a result of both the military’s growing dissatisfaction with governmental corruption and intervention and the royalist fears of Thaksin’s increasing autocratic tendencies. Although the coup was bloodless, the military leadership faces significant challenges if Thailand is not to descend into further instability and possible violence. Fears over the military’s honesty in terms of democracy and concerns about its economic competence, together with the Islamist insurgency currently plaguing the country’s south, mean that Thailand’s future peace and prosperity are far from guaranteed.
Thailand’s coup could perhaps be seen as inevitable considering the political paralysis that has gripped the country for most of 2006. Popular demonstrations over Thaksin’s creeping autocracy and perceived corruption earlier this year escalated to the point where the prime minister had to call snap elections in April. These elections were then declared invalid as the opposition parties boycotted the polls aware of the fact that Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party would retain power given its considerable support among the rural population. The political uncertainty caused by the lack of a constitutionally acceptable parliament was further exacerbated by the ambiguity surrounding Thaksin’s position. Although he resigned after the voided April election, he returned one month later as a ‘caretaker’ prime minister to oversee the country until the new elections, scheduled for October 2006, determined a new leader. It would appear that the possibility of Thaksin standing for another election, an election that he would most likely win, was unacceptable to a military tired of his interference and cronyism and a monarchy alarmed by accusations of his corruption and growing power. Thaksin’s trip to the UN meeting in New York provided the military with a perfect opportunity to remove him from the political equation. However, if the military holds on to power too long, mismanages the economy or mishandles the south’s dangerous Islamist insurgency, it might trigger violence and instability and may itself quickly experience the ignominy of a coup.
Although opinion polls show that a large majority of Thais support the coup, mostly because it appears to be backed by the country’s revered king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, they will not accept the long-term loss of democracy and any attempt by Sonthi to consolidate power will most likely lead to violence. Currently, the Thai military is expressing a desire for a return to democracy. It has promised to draft a new constitution that will pave the way for new elections and a return to civilian rule. It has also stated that a new interim administration will be in place within two weeks. However, the military leadership has also abolished the two chambers of parliament, the constitution and some of the courts, and at the very least the military-installed interim government will stay in power until the spring of 2007. It is therefore unlikely that any civilian government will be instated without the approval of the military. Thailand has a history of military interventions and draconian suppression, which suggests that the new military rule might not go quietly. If that is the case, violent opposition to the military government can be expected, and that in turn may subsequently be met with military repression.
The Thai economy provides another element to compound the present security concerns in the country. Economic mismanagement and corruption will raise tensions and increase the likelihood of violence. The military is already under pressure in this respect. Thailand has a dynamic economy, but it is complex and currently struggling. The paralysis in Thai politics over the past year and the fact that the Thai parliament has not met since February mean that the country’s bureaucracy and economic mechanisms have been on aimless autopilot. Investor confidence is already shaky. On 22 September, the Thai stock exchange fell to a two-month low and although a military administration can make economic decisions swiftly without the need for haggling and compromise, there are large question marks over its capability and desire to make difficult and yet essential decisions. The military’s handling of Thaksin also threatens the country’s stability. Sonthi and the other coup leaders may see the need to vilify Thaksin in order to justify their regime’s legitimacy. Consequently, a pursuit of Thaksin’s assets cannot be ruled out. However, if the military vigorously pursues Thaksin, his Thai Rak Thai party and his business friends, investor confidence could be further damaged, sending the country into a downward spiral. There is also a fear that, like military regimes in Thailand’s past, this one will simply line its pockets at the expense of the country as a whole. Such behaviour, or even the perception of such behaviour, will trigger popular uprisings, which in turn could result in bloodshed.
Despite reservations over the competency and democratic credentials of the military, there has been much speculation that the country’s new leaders will bring about a much improved security situation in the country’s restive south, where an Islamist insurgency has raged for the past few years and has claimed over 1,700 lives. Part of the rationale behind this belief is the fact that Sonthi is himself a Muslim and that, as a result, he will have more influence over the Islamists blamed for most of the violence. Another reason for the optimism is the belief that the military’s handling of the crisis will be more adept than Thaksin’s heavy-handed approach, which only served to inflame tensions further. Indeed, the new military leadership has already expressed a desire to negotiate with the separatists and to use targeted psychological warfare to isolate more extremist elements. However, there are no guarantees that the military will fare any better than Thaksin in this regard. Sonthi tried to initiate dialogue under the civilian government, but despite his Muslim ethnicity he had no luck. The degree of extremist religious activity is exceptionally high and the presence in the region of transnational jihadist organisations, such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah, suggests that the insurgency is robust and that the military government will have a hard time reining it in. Even if Sonthi’s Muslim background and shift from Thaksin’s uncompromising military strategy were to quell the insurgency, other sources of violence in the south would nonetheless remain - in addition to the ethnic strife, the region is also home to various criminal elements, warring drug trafficking factions and corrupt security forces. Although in the short-term there might be a drop-off in violence as these criminals and corrupt officials try to gauge the new government’s policy in the south, once they adjust to the changing policies and security environment there is likely to be a return to the normal levels of dangerous infighting and violence.
Thailand’s coup has ended the country’s prolonged and damaging political paralysis, and, in the short-term at least, red24 expects relative calm and little economic disruption. However, the clock is ticking for Sonthi and his colleagues. If the military administration does not take legitimate strides to reinstitute democracy or to manage the economy properly, there are no guarantees that the country will remain stable and peaceful.
Tags: travel safety, thailand
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